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Abstract—We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim
to create a shared secret key K, using a state-dependent wireless
broadcast channel that exists from one of the honest nodes to the
rest of the nodes including a passive eavesdropper Eve. All of
the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free and unlimited
rate public channel which is also observed by Eve. For this
setup, we develop an information-theoretically secure secret key
agreement protocol. We show the optimality of this protocol for
linear deterministic wireless broadcast channels as well as in the
high-SNR regime for wireless channels with large dynamic range
over channel states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key agreement protocols between a pair of nodes,
allowing for unlimited public discussion, was initiated in
seminal work of Maurer [1]. Group key agreement with public
discussion was developed in [4], where the key agreement
rate was established when the trusted users had access to a
private broadcast channel. The case when the eavesdropper
also had access to the broadcast channel was the main focus
of recent work in [7] which developed lower and outer bounds
for secrecy rates.
In this work we initiate the study of group secret key
agreement over a state dependent Gaussian broadcast channel.
This can be motivated by fading wireless channels, where
the channel states vary over time. The use of state-dependent
channels for secrecy has been of interest recently (see for
example [8] and references therein). To gain insight into our
problem, we first investigate a deterministic approximation of
the wireless channel as defined in [5]. For the deterministic
channel we will show that using a superposition based secrecy
scheme [9], we can develop a group key agreement protocol
that can be shown to be information-theoretically optimal. In
particular, we show that we can get the same key agreement
rate for the entire group as we would get for a single pair of
nodes. Therefore this result demonstrates that with unlimited
public discussion, we get secret key-agreement rates for linear
deterministic channels, that is invariant to network size.
To the best of our understanding, the scheme proposed in
[7] simulates source model and in order to create a secret key
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requires the “communication for omniscience by a neutral ob-
server”, i.e., a neutral observer can reconstruct all the sources
if given the eavesdropper output and the shared common
randomness. However, our scheme seems to be different since
we do not need such a condition.
We use the deterministic achievability scheme to get an
insight about the wireless broadcast channel with state. To this
end, we use a nested message set, degraded channel wiretap
code based on the broadcast approach of [9] to develop a
key-agreement protocol for the noisy broadcast problem. This
enables a scheme that converts the wireless channel with state
to behave similar to the deterministic case. Though this is
not optimal, we can demonstrate that when there is a large
dynamic range between the channel states, this scheme is
optimal in the degrees of freedom sense.
The paper is organized as follows. In §II we introduce
our notation and the problem formulation. In §III we state a
general upper bound for the key generation capacity and give
an achievability scheme for the Gaussian channel discussed in
§IV.
II. NOTATION AND SETUP
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters (e.g., X) to represent random vari-
ables (or more generally random objects). Given random vari-
ables X1, . . . , Xm, we write X1:m to denote (X1, . . . , Xm).
We use also Xt0:t to denote (X[t0], . . . , X[t]) where t is the
discrete time index. When t0 = 1 we simply write Xn to
denote (X[1], . . . , X[t]).
All vectors are column vectors unless otherwise stated. Bold
capital letters (e.g., A) are reserved for deterministic matrices.
For convenience, we use [i : j] to denote {i, i + 1, . . . , j}
where i, j ∈ Z. Let Uni(M) denote the uniform distribution
over the set M. For example, we use Uni(F￿q) to denote the
uniform distribution over vectors of length ￿ that are defined
over finite field Fq .
We abuse the notation H(·) to denote both entropy and
differential entropy depending on the context. During the
paper, all the logarithms are in base two.
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B. Problem Statement
In our problem setup, we consider m ≥ 2 terminals
T0, . . . ,Tm−1, which we will for convenience call “Alice,”
“Bob,” “Calvin,” etc. Alice can broadcast information to the
remaining nodes using a state dependent broadcast additive
white Gaussian channel. The goal of her broadcast transmis-
sions is to establish a secret key K among all the m terminals,
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. All terminals
can also utilize a cost-free public channel to send information
to each other.
In out state dependent channel model, we assume that for
each channel use the state remains the same for a block of
symbols of length L and changes independently from one
block to another block. We also assume that L is large enough
that enables us to apply information theoretical arguments
within each block, for noisy channels. The transmitted vector
sent by Alice is denoted by X ∈ RL. The received vectors
for every terminal and Eve depend on their channel states
for the particular time instant. We define a random variable
STi ∈ [0 : s] corresponding to the state of the channel
for the ith terminal and similarly define the random variable
SE ∈ [0 : s] for Eve. For the channel state of a receiver
r ∈ {T0, . . . ,Tm−1,E} we assume that1
P [Sr = k] = δk, k ∈ [0 : s].
Then we model the received vector by the receiver r by a state
dependent white Gaussian channel as follows2￿Xr[t] = hSr[t]X0[t] + Zr[t], (1)
where ￿Xr[t] ∈ RL and Zr[t] ∈ RL . For the additive noise of
each receiver we have Zr[t] ∼ N (0, IL). The channel gains
hi are some real constants such that
h0 ≤ · · · ≤ hs.
We also assume that the channel input is subject to an average
power constraint P , i.e.,
1
L
E
￿￿X0￿2￿ ≤ P.
Moreover, we assume that the channel state information (CSI)
is completely known by each receiver. So we define a com-
posite received vector for the receiver r as follows
Xr[t] = ( ￿Xr[t], Sr[t]).
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section we discuss some preliminary results which
are the foundation of our achievability scheme for the secret
key sharing over the Gaussian broadcast channel introduced
in (1).
1For simplicity, we consider a symmetric problem where the probability
distribution over the states is the same for all of the receivers (including
Eve). Moreover, we focus on a finite number of states. Both these restrictions
can be relaxed.
2During the paper, we use Ti and i interchangeably when they are used
as subscript. So instead of XTi we sometimes write Xi. At some points, we
also use XA and XB to denote for X0 and X1.
A. The General Upper Bound
As explained in [6, Section IV] combining the results of
[3] and [4] we can find an upper bound for the key generation
capacity for the cases where the channels from Alice to the
other terminals are independent, as follows
Theorem 1 ([6, Theorem 3]). The key generation capacity
of a multiterminal secret key sharing problem3 can be upper
bounded as follows4
Cs ≤ sup
p(x0)
min
j∈[1:m−1]
I(X0, Xj |XE).
Interpretation: Theorem 1 states that the key generation
capacity of a multi-terminal problem is upper bounded by the
best pairwise key generation upper bound between Alice and
the other honest terminals.
B. Deterministic Broadcast Channel
In this section we consider a channel model which is the
deterministic model for Gaussian channels as defined in [5].
The transmitted vector sent by Alice is denoted by X0 ∈ FLq .
The received vectors for every terminal and Eve depend on
their channel states for the particular time instant. We define
a random variable STi ∈ [0 : s] corresponding to the state
of the channel for the ith terminal and similarly define the
random variable SE ∈ [0 : s] for Eve. For the channel state of
a receiver r ∈ {T0, . . . ,Tm−1,E} we write
P [Sr = k] = δk, k ∈ [0 : s].
We then model the received vector by the receiver r by a state
dependent deterministic channel as follows￿Xr[t] = F Sr[t]X0[t], (2)
where F i ∈ FL×Lq for i ∈ [0 : s]. Moreover, we assume
that the state of a particular channel is available at the
corresponding receiver. We define a composite received vector
for the receiver r as follows
Xr = ( ￿Xr, Sr).
In order to capture and model the different SNR level for
the Gaussian channel we use the deterministic matrix model
developed in [5]. This implies that the matrices F i have the
following nested structure, capturing the degraded broadcast
structure:
0 = kerF s ⊂ kerF s−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ kerF 0 = FLq , and (3)
rank(F i − F i−1) = rank(F i)− rank(F i−1). (4)
For convenience we assume that F s = IL.
We can then state the following result, Theorem 2.
3For a precise definition of the “secret key generating protocol” and its
corresponding “key generation capacity” we refer to [1], [2], [4], [7].
4For the Gaussian version of our problem, we can adapt the result to include
an additional power constraint.
1961
Theorem 2. The key generation capacity of the deterministic
broadcast channel introduced in §III-B is given by
Cs =
s￿
j=1
[rankF j − rankF j−1] (
j−1￿
i=0
ρi) log q,
where ρi ￿ δi − 2δi(δ0 + · · ·+ δi−1)− δ2i .
Proof: 1) Upper Bound: Using Theorem 1 we can upper
bound the secrecy capacity. For the proof see the Appendix.
2) Lower Bound (Achievability Scheme): Because of (3) we
can find subspaces Π1, . . . ,Πs, such that Πi ∩Πj = 0 and
Π1 ⊕ kerF 1 = FLq ,
Π2 ⊕Π1 ⊕ kerF 2 = FLq ,
...
Πs ⊕ · · ·⊕Π1 ⊕ kerF s = FLq . (5)
Then for i ∈ [1 : s] we have dimΠi = rankF i − rankF i−1.
In our proposed achievability scheme, Alice uses superpo-
sition coding to create the vector
XA[t] = XA1[t] + · · ·+XAs[t], (6)
such that XAi[t] ∈ Πi. Because of (5), {Πi} form a basis for
FLq so every vector XA[t] ∈ FLq can be uniquely decomposed
as (6). Now each XAi[t] ∈ Πi can be considered as a vector
that is transmitted by Alice and will be received independently
by each trusted terminal and Eve with erasure probability θi ￿￿i−1
j=0 δi (the vector XAi[t] is correctly received by the rth
receiver only if Sr ≥ i).
So we may view the broadcast channel from Alice to the rest
of terminals as s independent packet erasure channels; where
Πi is the set of messages transmitted over the ith channel
(layer) and the erasure probability of the ith channel is θi.
We then proceed as follows. On each layer k we run the
group secrecy scheme proposed in [10] independently from the
other layers. The group secrecy rate for the erasure channel
secrecy with unlimited public discussion is given in [6] and is
summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 ([6, Theorem 1]). The achievable group secret key
generation rate for an packet erasure broadcast channel with
unlimited public discussion is given by
R = (1− θ)θ￿ log q,
where θ is the symmetric erasure probability for all nodes and
￿ log q is the packet size.
So by applying the above scheme for each layer and using
Lemma 1, for the total achievable secrecy rate we have
Rs =
s￿
k=1
Rk =
s￿
k=1
[rankF k − rankF k−1] (
k−1￿
i=0
ρi) log q,
because (1 − θk)θk =
￿k−1
i=0 ρi and ￿k = dim(Πk) =
rankF k − rankF k−1.
This result can be easily extended to the asymmetric case
where the channels to the legitimate users are not statistically
identical. Moreover, notice that in the symmetric case, the key-
generation rate is the same for any m ≥ 2, and therefore
this protocol scales ideally with the network size. Finally, the
critical difference between m = 2 and m > 2 is that the
key-reconciliation used ideas from network coding [10].
IV. GAUSSIAN BROADCAST CHANNEL
A. Upper Bound
Here, we apply the result of Theorem 1 to obtain an upper
bound for the key generation capacity as follows in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The key generation capacity of the Gaussian
broadcast channel given in (1) using public discussions is
upper bounded as follows
Cs ≤
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδj log
￿
1 +
h2iP
1 + h2jP
￿
.
Proof: See Appendix.
B. Lower Bound (Achievability Scheme)
Before giving the achievability scheme, let us define a
nested message set, degraded channel wiretap scenario as
follows
Definition 1. Assume a wiretap channel scenario where there
is a transmitter called Alice that broadcasts X and there are
s+1 receivers Yi where the ith receiver receives Yi according
to the broadcast channel (X , p(y0, . . . , ys|x),Y0× · · ·×Ys))
such that
p(y0, . . . , ys|x) = p(ys|x) · p(ys−1|ys) · · · p(y0|y1).
Suppose that Alice has s messagesW1, . . . ,Ws whereWi ∈
{1, . . . , 2LRi} and Wi ∼ Uni(1 : 2LRi). The goal is that she
wants to broadcast these messages such that ∀i:
(i) each message Wi should be decodable by the receivers
Yi, . . . , Ys with a negligible error probability, and
(ii) all the receivers Y0, . . . , Yi−1 should be ignorant about the
message Wi, namely for the leakage rate we have
R(L)l,i ￿
1
L
I(Wi+1, . . . ,Ws;Y
1:L
i ) ≤ ￿L, ∀i ∈ [0 : s].
Then we can state the following result.
Theorem 4. Using a properly designed layered wiretap code
similar to [9] we can achieve the following set of rates for the
nested message set, degraded Gaussian wiretap channel.
Ri = log
￿
1 +
h2iPi
1 + h2i Ii
￿
− log
￿
1 +
h2i−1Pi
1 + h2i−1Ii
￿
, (7)
∀i ∈ [1 : s], where Ii ￿
￿s
j=i+1 Pj .
By using a layered coding scheme for the nested message
set, degraded channel wiretap channel defined in Definition 1,
we can convert the Gaussian channel given in (1) to a set
of s independent erasure channels where the erasure of the
messages for each channel (layer) depends on the receiver
1962
channel state. In fact using the layered coding scheme for the
wiretap channel, we mimic the orthogonality behavior that we
have for the deterministic channel as described by (3) and (5).
More precisely, we assume that Alice broadcasts the L-
length vector XA[t] =
￿s
i=1XAi[t], where she maps Wi (the
messages corresponding to the ith layer) to XAi[t] according
to the codebook described in the following. We construct s
codebooks Cˆi(2LRˆi , L) each contains 2LRˆi codewords XLAi
by choosing L symbols independently from the Gaussian
distribution N (0, Pi) where
Rˆi = log
￿
1 +
h2iPi
1 + h2i Ii
￿
.
Each codebook Cˆi, i ∈ [1 : s], is divided into 2LRi bins where
Ri is given by (7). At each layer i, the message Wi is coded
so as to be secure from all receivers in states j < i. This
is done by a standard wiretap code (see also [9]), where the
message Wi is the bin-index and the transmit sequence XAi
is a (random) sequence from the the bin. So, the ith layer can
transmits 2LRi messages securely from the “weaker” receivers.
Following a similar argument as stated in [9], we can show
that the receiver r which observes the channel state Sr =
i can decode messages up to layer i and is ignorant about
messages of layers above i. So, equivalently, we can say that
the message Wi experiences erasure probability θi =
￿i−1
j=0 δj
when it passes through the channel (1).
Now for each layer i, we run the interactive scheme of
§III-B where Alice broadcasts a sequence of random messages
Wni . Then, by discussing over the public channel, the trusted
terminals reconcile their secret messages to build a common
key. The key generation rate for each layer is ∆iRi so for a
fixed power allocation we achieve the following secrecy rate
Rs ≤
s￿
i=1
∆iRi,
where Ri is defined in (7) and ∆i ￿ (1− θi)θi.
The maximum secrecy rate is obtained by optimizing the
above rate over the power allocations {Pi}. So we can write
Rs =
 max
￿s
i=1∆iRi
subject to
￿s
i=1 Pi ≤ P
Pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1 : s].
(8)
Because R1 is an increasing function of P1 when other Pi are
kept fixed and Ri does not depend on P1 for i > 1 we can
write the power constant inequality as an equality.
The important special case of this optimization problem is
when there is a large dynamic range between the channel
states, and we focus on this case applied to the high SNR
regime. This enables us to demonstrate an optimal power
allocation for this regime in Section IV-C.
C. High SNR Regime
By large dynamic range in the states, we mean that hi ￿
hi−1, ∀i ∈ [1 : s], where this comparison is done with respect
to SNR. In particular, we denote h2i = SNR
−αi , for i ∈ [0 : s],
where h2i > h2i−1 implying that αi < αi−1. Suppose we apply
a power allocation which is given as follows, Pi = SNRβi ,
∀i ∈ [1 : s], with the assumption that βi < βi−1. Since βi <
βi−1, in high SNR regime Ii is dominated by SNRβi+1 . Using
this approximation, we can rewrite the expression for Ri from
(7) as follows
Ri
·
= log
￿
1 +
SNRβi−αi
1 + SNRβi+1−αi
￿
− log
￿
1 +
SNRβi−αi−1
1 + SNRβi+1−αi−1
￿
,
that simplifies to
Ri
·
=
￿￿
(βi − αi)− (βi+1 − αi)+
￿+￿
log SNR
−
￿￿
(βi − αi−1)− (βi+1 − αi−1)+
￿+￿
log SNR,
where we use the notation “ ·=” and “
·≤” for exponential
equality and inequality with respect to SNR. Using the power
allocation β1 = 1 − ￿ and βi = αi−1 − ￿, ∀i ∈ [2 : s], with
￿ > 0 and ￿￿ 1 we can write
Ri = (αi−1 − ￿− αi) log SNR ·= (αi−1 − αi) log SNR.
Intuitively βi = αi−1 can be interpreted as a power allocation
matching the channel gains. So, for the total achievable secrecy
rate we have
Rs
·
=
s￿
i=1
∆i(αi−1 − αi) log SNR =
s￿
i=1
∆i log
h2i
h2i−1
. (9)
Now, let us state the upper bound to Cs in the high SNR
regime in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Assuming high-SNR regime and large dynamic
range over channel states we can upper bound Cs as follows
Cs
·≤
s￿
i=1
∆i(αi−1 − αi) log SNR.
This upper bound is matched with the achievable rate derived
in (9), so the above equation characterizes Cs in this regime.
REFERENCES
[1] U. M. Maurer, “Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion From
Common Information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39, 1993.
[2] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common Randomness in Information
Theory and Cryptography, Part I: Secret Sharing,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, Jul. 1993.
[3] I. Csiszar and P. Narayan, “Secrecy capacities for multiple terminals,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 50, no. 12, Dec. 2004.
[4] I. Csiszar and P. Narayan, “Secrecy capacities for multiterminal channels,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, Jun. 2008.
[5] A S. Avestimehr, S. N. Diggavi and D. N. C. Tse, “Wireless Network
Information Flow,” 45th Allerton Conf. On Comm., Control, and Com-
puting, Monticello, Illinois, USA, Sep. 2007.
[6] M. Jafari Siavoshani, C. Fragouli, S N. Diggavi, U. Pulleti, and K. Ar-
gyraki, “Group secret key generation over broadcast erasure channels,”
Asilomar, Nov. 2010.
[7] A. A. Gohari and V. Anantharam, “Information-Theoretic key agreement
of multiple terminals - Part II: channel model,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 3997–4010, Aug. 2010.
1963
[8] A. Khisti, S. N. Diggavi, and G. W. Wornell, “Secret-key agreement
over wiretap channels with random state parameters,” to appear IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2011.
[9] Y. Liang, L. Lai, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “The Broadcast
Approach over Fading Gaussian Wiretap Channels,” IEEE Information
Theory Workshop, 2009.
[10] M. Jafari Siavoshani, U. Pulleti, E. Atsan, I. Safaka, C. Fragouli, K.
Argyraki, S. Diggavi, “Exchanging Secrets without Using Cryptography,”
Arxiv preprint http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4991.
V. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2 (Upper bound): Using Theorem 1 we
can write Cs ≤ I(XA, XB|XE), where we have H(XA|XE) =￿s−1
i=0 δi [H(XA)−H(F iXA)], and H(XA|XB, XE) =￿s−1
i=0
￿
2δi(δ0 + · · ·+ δi−1) + δ2i
￿
[H(XA)−H(F iXA)]. So
we have I(XA, XB|XE) =
￿s−1
i=0 ρi [H(XA)−H(F iXA)],
where ρi ￿ δi − 2δi(δ0 + · · · + δi−1) − δ2i . Knowing that
H(F iXA) = H(F iXA,F i−1XA), applying the chain rule,
and doing some mathematical manipulation, we can write
Cs ≤ I(XA, XB|XE) =
s￿
j=1
H(F jXA|F j−1XA)
j−1￿
i=0
ρi
=
s￿
j=1
H ([F j − F j−1]XA|F j−1XA)
j−1￿
i=0
ρi
≤
s￿
j=1
H ([F j − F j−1]XA)
j−1￿
i=0
ρi
(a)≤
s￿
j=1
rank (F j − F j−1)
￿
j−1￿
i=0
ρi
￿
log q
(b)
=
s￿
j=1
[rankF j − rankF j−1]
￿
j−1￿
i=0
ρi
￿
log q, (10)
where (a) is true because uniform distribution on XA achieves
the maximum values for all the entropies in the summation
and (b) is true because of (4). Also, note that
￿j−1
i=0 ρi =
θj(1− θj) ≥ 0, where θj =
￿j−1
i=0 δi.
Proof of Theorem 3: Using Theorem 1 we can write
Cs ≤ I(XA;XB|XE) = I(XA; ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SB), Hence, we
have
Cs ≤ I(XA;XB|XE)
= H( ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SE)−H( ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SE, XA)
(a)
= H( ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SE)−H( ￿XB, SB|XA)
= H( ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SE)−H(SB|XA)−H( ￿XB|SB, XA)
= H( ￿XB, SB| ￿XE, SE)−H(SB)−H(ZB)
= H( ￿XB, ￿XE|SE, SB) +H(SE, SB)
−H( ￿XE, SE)−H(SB)−H(ZB)
= H( ￿XB, ￿XE|SE, SB)−H( ￿XE|SE)−H(ZB)
=
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδjH( ￿XB, ￿XE|SE = j, SB = i)
−
s￿
k=0
δkH( ￿XE|SE = k)−H(ZB)
=
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδjH(hiXA + ZB, hjXA + ZE)
−
s￿
k=0
δkH(hkXA + ZE)−H(ZB)
=
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδjH(hiXA + ZB|hjXA + ZE)−H(ZB)
(b)≤
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδj log(2πe(var(hiXA + ZB|hjXA + ZE)))
−H(ZB), (11)
where (a) is true since we have XB ↔ XA ↔ XE and
(b) follows from the fact that for a fixed variance, Gaussian
distribution maximizes the entropy.
Equality in (b), (11), is achieved when (hiXA+ZB|hjXA+
ZE) has a Gaussian distribution. A sufficient condition for
this to be satisfied is when XA, ZB, and ZE are Gaussian
and independent. This observation makes the calculation of
log(2πe var(hiXA + ZB|hjXA + ZE)) much easier as it is
equivalent to the evaluation of H(hiXA +ZB, hjXA +ZE)−
H(hjXA + ZE) when XA, ZB, and ZE are Gaussian and
independent as shown below,
H(hiXA + ZB, hjXA + ZE)−H(hjXA + ZE) =
log((2πe)2(1 + h2iP + h
2
jP ))− log(2πe(1 + h2jP )),
where E
￿
X2A
￿
= P . Hence, the secrecy upper bound becomes
Cs ≤
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδj log((2πe)
2(1 + h2iP + h
2
jP ))
−
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδj log(2πe(1 + h
2
jP ))− log(2πe)
=
s￿
i=0
s￿
j=0
δiδj log
￿
1 +
h2iP
1 + h2jP
￿
,
and we are done.
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